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The Communicative Construction of Safety in Wildland Firefighting 
 
I. Abstract 
 This document is a summary of a mixed methods dissertation that examined the 
communicative construction of safety in wildland firefighting. For the dissertation, I used a two-
study mixed methods approach, examining the communicative accomplishment of safety from 
two perspectives: high reliability organizing (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999), and safety 
climate (Zohar, 1980).  
 In Study One, 27 firefighters from two functionally similar wildland firefighting crews 
were interviewed about their crew-level interactions involved in implementing safety rules and 
firefighting tasks. These critical incident narratives (Flanagan, 1954; Gremler, 2004) were 
compared to extract workgroup level similarities and differences in interaction patterns relating 
to local routines and application of safety rules for managing tasks and space. Findings revealed 
that the two crews differed substantially in their communicative interactions related to three 
specific routines: planning, use of safety rules, and authority. The crews also differed in their 
general interactions with one another related to safety, groupness, and efficiency. 
 For Study Two, a survey assessing workgroup-level safety climate was completed by 379 
wildland firefighters representing 220 crews. Safety climate refers to the degree to which an 
organization’s practices emphasize safety over production pressures (Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
Safety climate constructs assessed in this study include:  safety communication, failure learning 
behaviors, work safety tension, and psychological safety. Based on findings from Study One, I 
included additional measures to capture crew staffing patterns (dispersed, co-located), work 
styles (independent, task interdependent), crew prestige, and the value of after action reviews 
(AARs). Hypotheses tested and modeled relationships among variables to determine how crew 
configurations and work styles combined to influence learning behaviors, member comfort with 
communicating safety concerns, and the value of communication and learning practices. 
 To mix the methods from the two studies, I followed an initiation mixed methods design 
(Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989), in which I examined areas of incongruence between the 
two studies in order to prompt new insights, and recast how safety is a communicative 
accomplishment in wildland firefighting workgroups. Finally, recommendations are presented 
for enhancing the crew-level safety communication environment. 
 
II. Background and Purpose 
 The core of the dissertation project summarized in this document is examining how safety 
is a social accomplishment that occurs within the workgroup—or crew—environment. This two-
study mixed-methods dissertation used a communication-centered approach to examine two 
perspectives on safety in wildland firefighting crews. The crew level of analysis is central to both 
studies because the crew is the social unit where the organization is translated for members and 
where the forces of socialization and membership are the strongest (Moreland & Levine, 2001). 
Thus, members hold themselves and each other accountable to “how things are done here” on 
their crew. The overarching questions guiding both studies include: how do crew-level 
interaction routines for implementing organization-wide safety rules (e.g., LCES, 10 &18) differ 
between functionally similar crews (Study One)? And, what factors in the crew environment are 
most influential in shaping how members interact with one another regarding task 
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implementation and learning (Study Two)? 
 Study One investigated safety from a high reliability organizing (HRO) perspective in 
which the primary mechanism for safety is rooted in consistent actions and interactions among 
members as they implement firefighting tasks and organization-wide safety rules. A qualitative 
study compared how two functionally-similar heli-rappel crews implemented firefighting tasks, 
highlighting key differences in the two crews’ routines. Implications for high reliability 
organizing are discussed. 
 Study Two examined safety from a safety climate perspective whose central mechanisms 
for safe outcomes include ways that the workgroup environment accepts or encourages safety-
related activities and members’ voicing of safety concerns. A wide scale survey assessed safety 
climate variables across 220 wildland firefighting crews. 
 
III. Study One: High Reliability and Wildland Firefighting 
 
 Study One explored safety from the perspective of high reliability organizing. An HRO 
perspective assumes that organizing occurs under conditions of situational ambiguity, such as 
fluctuating environments or complex organizational structures (Rochlin, 1993). Based on these 
ambiguous conditions, threats to safety arise when hazards go unnoticed or errors accumulate. 
Therefore, this perspective considers that the central mechanisms for safety are those that 
contribute to consistently error-free organizing processes (Weick, 1987). Research examines how 
member actions and interactions yield consistent patterns for anticipating, noticing, managing 
and learning about difficult-to-detect hazards (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993). Theory-building related to HROs identifies how local learning (e.g., from 
accidents) becomes available to the broader organization (e.g., through new rules or policies); 
and likewise, how the organization’s body of knowledge (particularly from accidents) can 
become relevant and accessible to members in their everyday actions. In wildland firefighting the 
Ten Standard Firefighting Orders and 18 Situations that Shout Watchout are examples of 
organization-level knowledge derived from fatalities and accidents (Zeigler, 2007). Study One 
examined this recursive interplay between organizational knowledge—specifically, the 10 & 18 
and LCES—and local action routines occurring at the workgroup level--specifically what the two 
crews did to implement the safety rules. 
 Existing HRO research advances cognitive-based models explaining how organizations 
function as systems of interconnected parts (Weick & Roberts, 1993), and how members notice 
and exchange information about safety cues (Weick, 1995). A cognitive approach asks how 
individual members make sense through action, generating a cognitive representation of their 
surrounding environment which allows them to notice and bracket cues and gain understandings 
of cause/effect relationships (Weick, 1995). However, this literature excludes an important 
element in the wildland firefighting environment, namely interactions that socially construct 
crew organizing, especially interaction that shapes norms and practices regarding hazards and 
use of safety rules. A communication perspective can significantly contribute to the cognitive-
based HRO research because it examines workgroup interaction--where the organization is 
translated for members and where the forces of socialization and membership are the strongest 
(Moreland & Levine, 2001).  
 A communication constitutes organization (CCO) theoretical approach examines how the 
organization and the individual are linked as members share actions and in doing so constitute 
the organization (Bencherki & Cooren, 2001). The core mechanism of CCO is a dialectical 
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relationship between text and conversation (Robichaud, Giroux, & Taylor, 2004). Texts are past 
instantiations of the organization that occur through interaction and are referenced in subsequent 
interactions. Conversations generate, reify or change texts. Ongoing interactions referencing the 
organization develop sustained practices where knowledge becomes textualized. As text, 
knowledge is grounded in practices such as ongoing interactions involved in problem solving, 
rather than individual instantiations of sensemaking. Co-orientation is the foundation of 
conversation. Co-orientation involves members interacting about an object, such as 
implementing a rule. Each member brings into the interaction his or her own organizational 
perspective toward the object (e.g., supervisors see rules differently than do subordinates). 
Members orient toward the object differently, and they also orient toward one another (e.g., as 
supervisor to subordinate and vice versa). Their organizational perspectives inform how each 
party negotiates what to do about the object. 
 Constitutive communication is located in processes such as how rules and routines are 
used differently across HRO workgroups. From this view, rules and routines enter into members’ 
conversations--sometimes as the object of interaction, other times alluded to or implied. Rules 
are general directives meant for flexible application across numerous situations, and as such, 
require interpretation based on local norms and practices (Zhou, 1993). Routines are patterns of 
action that persist over time (Pentland & Feldman, 2005) and are considered “effortful 
accomplishments” because unpredictable circumstances mean that routines can never be fully 
standardized. Communicative interactions bring rules and routines into conversation where they 
are interpreted and enacted, meaning that routines often comprise the local actions that enact an 
organization’s wider-reaching rules (Becker, 2004). Therefore, if reliability is conceptualized as 
consistent patterns of action across the organization for enacting rules or routines, then it is 
important to know whether and how workgroups within the same HRO differ in their practices 
and interaction patterns. If there is variation across the HRO in workgroup-level enactments of 
rules and routines, then what are the implications for high reliability, and ultimately, safety?  
 Study One research questions asked: 1) how critical incidents from two crews compared 
in the ways firefighters co-oriented to enact firefighting rules and routines, 2) how critical 
incidents from the two crews compared in ways firefighters oriented toward the object of 
material space, 3) how norms compared between the two crews and informed their texts; how the 
texts of each crew pointed to similar or different sets of sustained practices for implementing 
rules and routines, and 4) how the two crews’ texts point to interactions that facilitate learning. 
 
III(a). Study One Methods  
 Study One used interpretive methods to examine crew-level interactions and norms that 
influence task implementation and enactment of safety rules. Interviews were conducted with 27 
firefighters from two wildland fighting crews, Manzanita (Region Five; 12 interviewees) and 
West Fork (Region Four; 15 interviewees). Individual, semi-structured interviews addressed: 1) 
Workgroup norms—new member socialization, personal struggles to adjust, and how their 
current crew experiences differed from previous ones. 2) Critical incidents—descriptions of a 
memorable fire experience that was important for developing their firefighter expertise, such as 
instances when fire activity surprised them, when something went wrong/well, or situations in 
which they took responsibility or assumed leadership. Interviews lasted 30-60 minutes and 
yielded more than 400 pages of transcript. 
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Table 1  
Study One Participants and Crews 
West Fork (Region 4) Manzanita (Region 5) 
Interview Participants 
15 members: 12 males, 3 females 12 members: 11 males, 1 female 
 
 Crew Structures 
25 people, 2 helicopters 
Low turnover; Long crew tenure 
Highly qualified; Few “apprentices”  
20 people, 1 helicopter 
High turnover; Short crew tenure 
Lower level quals; Many “apprentices” 
Crew splits into modules, members rotate  
Few formal or informal AARs 
Crew travels together almost always  
Numerous formal and informal AARs 
 
 I analyzed the data in two parts: First, I extracted all of the co-orientations from the critical 
incidents and sorted them based on the object of interaction (e.g., a rule, routine and use of 
space). I used a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006) to map the co-orientations, noting 
accounts of conflict, dialogue, power struggle, etc. Second, I sorted the data related to workgroup 
text. I used an open coding procedure (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to label crew-specific norms and 
expectations such as efficiency, learning and so on. I then mapped each crew’s text noting how 
workgroup expectations influenced the pressures members felt and informed their practices. 
 
III(b). Study One Results  
 Research Question 1. The first research question examined workgroup level routines for 
implementing safety and firefighting tasks. This question explored the ways the two crews’ 
members engaged in organizing, or co-oriented, through communicative interactions for 
implementing safety and firefighting tasks. From an HRO perspective, the primary mechanisms 
for safety are the consistent patterns of action for managing and anticipating hazards. These 
consistent patterns of action were the crews’ local routines. Findings revealed that the crews 
differed substantially on three routines: planning, use of safety rules and authority. The two 
crews were each aware of their collective experience levels, and as a result, how they needed to 
interact within the crew in order to facilitate consistent actions and stay abreast of emerging 
hazards. For example, the high number of inexperienced Manzanita members created a practical 
need for members to learn as quickly as possible. Therefore, a mentorship interaction pattern was 
embedded in the crew’s planning, rule-use and authority routines. West Fork members, on the 
other hand, were highly experienced and often tasked with handling challenging situations that 
other crews were not qualified to handle. The mechanism for reliable actions took a different 
form for West Fork than it did for Manzanita. Whereas the goal for most of Manzanita’s 
activities involved helping inexperienced firefighters gain experience, the main goal for West 
Fork members was to gain experience acting autonomously because most members were highly 
experienced they collectively considered themselves to be experts. Thus, mechanisms for 
reliably safe action were rooted in developing skills at individually evaluating situations, 
devising and defending plans, and voicing dissent. Interactions involving autonomy, discernment 
and asserting one’s position characterized the planning, rule-use and authority routines. 
 Research Question 2. Because the situational ambiguity of the complex and ever-
changing physical environment plays such a prominent role in the HRO perspective, the second 
research question examined how the two crews managed material space when implementing 
firefighting tasks and safety. For Manzanita, configuring the fire’s spatial environment involved 
talking through options for locating escape routes and safety zones in relation to various terrain 
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features and the fire. This process of managing space was embedded in the mentorship-based 
interactions between members that comprised the planning and rule-use routines. In contrast, 
several West Fork members described close-call incidents in which their safety zone was 
inadequate and they had to run from the fire. These experiences created a visceral understanding 
of space that caused them to change their subsequent implementations of safety zones. Thus, 
through close-call incidents, members deepened their understandings about difficult-to-detect 
hazards that trigger sudden changes in fire size, and adapted new methods for configuring their 
firefighting work environments. They gained understanding about where to place safety zones 
and escape routes and began to anticipate how the time of day and weather changes would 
influence certain spatial configurations (e.g., the proximity of safety zones relative to the fire), 
described a more deliberate process for anticipating and responding to changing or problematic 
circumstances. 
 Research Question 3. The third research question explored how past conversations 
(coorientations) that referenced the workgroup and safety routines served as a basis for members' 
ongoing instantiations of the organization. Texts refer to accumulations of past coorientations, or 
interactions (Taylor & Van Every, 2000). Relative to high reliability organizing, this research 
question addressed how past interactions set a precedent for future interactions. Manzanita’s 
interactions reflected that members prioritized the importance of training for its relatively 
inexperienced members. As such, their way of addressing this need was to embed a mentorship-
based interaction in their routines. To contrast, West Fork’s needs involved pushing members to 
act expertly and independently; to address the need, members (somewhat unintentionally) 
challenged themselves to engage in conflict-based interactions in which they practiced asserting 
themselves. From these different sets of needs, the two crews differed on three texts, including 
notions of groupness, efficiency and safety. For Manzanita, groupness was achieved through 
task-related communicative activities that built trust and cohesion. Efficiency was defined by 
members’ abilities to notice and communicate about problems and safety concerns quickly and 
accurately. Safety was rooted in learning practices that pushed less experienced members to see 
and talk about fireline situations. All three of these texts interrelated to contribute to an 
environment that facilitated free exchange of questions and encouraged members to raise 
concerns and insights to facilitate learning. For West Fork, groupness was achieved through non-
task related “fun” activities in which members played sports together or “joked around.” 
However, the defining aspect of the West Fork’s groupness was related to its expectations for 
professionalism; thus, it was equally important for members to demonstrate that they knew the 
difference between “work time” and “play time.” Efficiency meant moving quickly and acting 
without supervision. Safety resulted from members’ abilities to think and act appropriately as 
individuals. These three texts contributed to creating expectations for members not only to act as 
experts, but also to see themselves as such.  
 Research Question 4. The final research question synthesized how the findings about 
coorientation, management of material space and crew texts inform what we know about how 
“high reliability” organizing occurs in wildland firefighting. Findings from Study One suggested 
that both Manzanita and West Fork crews operated as models of high reliability organizations, 
but that they did so by creating different types of expectations and interaction patterns. Further, 
both environments were better suited for some firefighters more than others. Specifically, less 
experienced firefighters would benefit from Manzanita’s encouragement of open dialogue and 
learning as mechanisms for generating consistently safe actions. In contrast, firefighters with a 
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baseline of experience should seek employment on crews like West Fork where they would be 
pushed to use their expertise and gain deeper experience through facing tough challenges. 
 
IV. Study Two: Safety Climate and Wildland Firefighting 
 
 Like the HRO perspective, the safety climate perspective also takes safety as its central 
problem. This perspective assumes that organizing processes occur under conditions in which 
high rates of production or output are prioritized (Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005). In this 
context, the primary obstacles to safety are attitudes and patterns of communication that de-value 
safety or discourage the implementation of it (Morrow, et al., 2010). Therefore, this perspective 
considers that the central mechanisms for safety are attitudes and behaviors that demonstrate 
value and commitment to safety by both vertical and lateral organization members. Safety 
climates depend on supervisors and subordinates sharing the same value for safe actions, while 
co-workers must also demonstrate their mutual commitment to prioritizing safe behaviors 
(Hofmann & Mark, 2006).  
 Research on safety climate takes a post-positivist view, typically using quantitative 
methods to identify dimensions of the construct and to model relationships among predictor and 
criterion variables in various production-based organizational contexts, such as manufacturing 
and construction (Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Safety can be 
problematic in industrial contexts because workers struggle against time pressures to meet 
demanding production goals. Implementing safety involves extra steps and takes extra time, 
which hinders workers’ abilities to meet these goals. As such, the social environment—
hierarchically and/or laterally—might be hostile to members who display safe behaviors (and 
thus are slow). Therefore, safety climate studies are particularly concerned with factors in the 
work environment that discourage safe action.  
 The study of safety climates also applies to high hazard organizations such as wildland 
firefighting in which the pressures to respond quickly to changing circumstances or emergent 
hazards might encourage members to cut corners in implementing safety. In wildland firefighting, 
as with other time-driven organizations, safety not only depends on safe attitudes, but on 
members communicating their safety concerns (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). On this basis, Study 
Two assessed the safety climate of wildland firefighters across three federal agencies. The design 
of Study Two’s safety climate survey incorporated key findings from Study One that informed 
the wildland firefighting communicative interaction context.  Measures were adapted to assess 
the following group-level constructs: safety communication (ability to discuss safety issues with 
supervisors in-the-moment) (Hofman & Stetzer, 1988); task interdependence/independence 
(Pearce & Gregerson, 1991); failure learning behaviors (processes to learn retrospectively from 
failures) (Carmeli, 2007); psychological safety (ability to discuss/take interpersonal risks in the 
crew) (Edmondson, 1999); crew prestige (Mael & Ashforth, 1992); and work-safety tension 
(belief that the organization values productivity over safety) (Morrow, et al., 2009). Items also 
asked crews to assess their use of After Action Reviews (AARs), retrospective group discussions 
used for firefighter learning. I assessed frequency of and common reasons prompting AARs and 
the degree to which crew members value AARs. In the findings that follow, please note that the 
Likert scales ranged from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 7 (Strongly Disagree) such that lower scores 
indicate higher levels of agreement. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Crew-Level Scales 
     
N α M SD 
Task Interdependence 220 .69 1.98 .69 
Independence 220 .73 2.93 1.02 
Crew Prestige 220 .84 1.96 .69 
Safety Communication 220 .73 2.09 .74 
Psychological Safety 220 .68 2.16 .77 
Failure Learning 220 .88 2.20 .73 
Social WST 220 .57 5.24 .97 
Environmental WST 220 .62 4.25 1.19 
Value of AARs 220 .87 2.38 .88 
AAR Frequency 220 n/a 2.68 1.36 
 
 Three research questions addressed the following: 1) how crew staffing patterns (co-
located, dispersed) were related to work style (independent, task interdependent), crew 
communication activities and the crew’s interaction environment; 2) how independence and task 
interdependence related to each another in the context of wildland firefighting work; and 3) how 
crew communication activities shaped (and were shaped by) aspects of the crew interaction 
environment. Each research question includes specific hypotheses. 
 
IV(a). Study Two Methods  
 A survey assessing workgroup safety culture was completed online by N= 379 federal 
wildland firefighters. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 60 years old, with a median age of 33 
(M = 35, SD = 8 years). There were 330 males (87%), 45 females (12%); four participants did 
not report their sex. Ethnicity included 277 Whites, 23 Hispanics, 11 Native Americans, four 
African Americans, two Asian Americans, and 62 participants did not report ethnicity. Of the 
participants, 108 worked on engines, 54 on Type 2 crews (handcrews, initial attack or fuels 
crews), 113 were from interagency hotshot crews, and 104 from helitack or heli-rappel crews. 
There was participation from members at all levels in the crew-level chain of command 
including 75 superintendents, 58 foremen, 35 assistant foremen, 66 captains, 53 squad leaders, 
40 senior firefighters, 49 non-supervisory members, and 3 did not report their crew position. 
Overall, the demographics generally represent wildland firefighting within the prominent federal 
wildland firefighting agencies (US Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National 
Park Service).i  
 Because the survey was administered in early fall, the sample did not capture the seasonal 
workforce of college students who often have jobs as non-supervisory members and senior 
firefighters. For this reason, responses were heavily weighted toward the higher-level crew 
supervisors. Also due to missing the seasonal student workforce, fire experience and crew tenure 
were relatively high overall. Participants had a median of 12 wildland firefighting seasons (M = 
13.15, SD = 6.82), and a median of five seasons on their current crew (M = 6.14, SD = 4.75). 
 After data were screened, they were aggregated by crew, which resulted in representation 
from 220 crews. All analyses assessed the crew level. There was nearly equal representation 
across the four primary interagency crew types: hotshot (60 crews), helitack/rappel (57 crews), 
engine (74 crews) and Type 2 handcrews (29 crews). The majority of participating crews were 
from the western states. 
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Table 3 
Number of Crews that Responded to the Survey by State 
State N Percent State N Percent 
California 35 15.9 South Dakota 4 1.8 
Idaho 34 15.5 Florida 3 1.4 
Oregon 26 11.8 Missouri 2 .9 
Montana 22 10.0 Tennessee 2 .9 
Colorado 18 8.2 Arkansas 2 .9 
Wyoming 17 7.7 Nebraska 1 .5 
Utah 12 5.5 Illinois 1 .5 
Arizona 10 4.5 Mississippi 1 .5 
Washington 8 3.6 Georgia 1 .5 
New Mexico 8 3.6 Kansas 1 .5 
Minnesota 6 2.7 North Carolina 1 .5 
Nevada 5 2.3    
   TOTAL 220 100 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Geographic Distribution of Participating Crews 
 
 
IV(b). Study Two Results 
 RQ1. The first research question examined how staffing patterns influenced safety 
climate. The difference between co-located and dispersed staffing patterns was important in 
Study One because it seemed to shape each crews’ ability to institute regular communication-
based routines, and secondly, groups who work together all the time might be more comfortable 
together than groups whose members are always coming and going. The Study Two findings 
revealed that co-located crews and dispersed crews differed (as would be expected) with co-
located crews revealing significantly higher task interdependency and significantly lower 
independence than dispersed crews. However, it was notable that co-located and dispersed crews 
did not differ significantly on any of the interaction environment or communication activity 
variables (see Table 4).  
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Table 4  
Study Two: Research Question 1 Hypothesis and Results 
 
Findings from H1 suggested that staffing patterns might play a less important role in the safety 
climate than indicated in Study One. The implication for high reliability organizing is that 
consistency in action can emerge even if there is inconsistency in staffing. Considered in relation 
to Study One, this finding points to the importance of crew text. Manzanita and West Fork 
enacted their crew texts for efficiency, groupness and safety in different ways, and likewise, the 
texts informed their actions. Their collectively-held understanding of what made their crews 
distinctive served as a guide for their actions. Thus, even though West Fork members did not 
work together often, they still collectively understood that their crew text for efficiency, for 
example, meant that they were to accomplish tasks quickly without supervision. Thus, in relation 
to these Study Two findings, the crew’s co-located or dispersed staffing pattern might play a less 
crucial role in guiding member action as compared to the influence of the crew’s text. Therefore, 
the crew text provided specific guidelines for action (e.g., as a mentor or expert) that were 
consistent, regardless of whether the crew worked in a co-located manner or not.  
  
Table 5 
Study Two: Research Question 2 Hypotheses and Results 
 
 RQ2. The second research question investigated how independence and task 
interdependence related to each other in influencing safety climate. This finding indicated that 
task interdependence and independence are not opposite measures, as Study One findings 
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seemed to indicate: Manzanita appeared to operate in a task-interdependent manner while West 
Fork was notably independent. Instead, these concepts appeared to capture different types of 
activities in the wildland firefighting context, rather than crew-specific organizing styles.  
 Hypothesis 2a revealed that specialty areas varied widely on independence, while they 
did not vary much on task interdependence (H2b). Further, high independence was a moderately 
strong predictor for low social work safety tension (social pressure from crew members to take 
risks) (H4). These findings suggest that crews in which members were accustomed to making 
their own decisions might have trusted themselves more and, as a result, might have been more 
resistant to the influences of the group regarding taking risks. 
 Task interdependence seemed to be a description of what was required for firefighting 
work tasks in general because most tasks are relatively large scale and require more than one 
person to accomplish. However, there were some relationships in which task interdependence 
seemed to distinguish among crews. Specifically, task interdependence was a significant and 
strong predictor (along with failure learning activities) of crew prestige (H8; see Table 6 below). 
From the importance of task interdependence in that regression equation, it can be reasonably 
inferred that the degree to which members felt it was necessary to work together on tasks might 
have boosted their feelings that their collaborations were necessary to produce high-quality work. 
This, in turn, might have enhanced their evaluation of the quality of the crew (its crew prestige). 
In contrast, working independently might not have cued members to feel that collective effort 
was useful, and as a result, might not be an important contributor to members valuing the quality 
and reputation of the workgroup’s efforts. A strong sense of task interdependence might cue an 
awareness of the collective crew, which may cause firefighters to consider more conservative 
actions regarding hazards because they are more aware of the safety implications for their entire 
crew. 
 Taken together, independence seemed to describe how a crew went about conducting 
work, while task interdependence tended to describe the kinds of responses required for the 
large-scale coordination-intensive tasks involved in wildland firefighting. Also, crew specialties 
tend to vary from one another on several of their duties, which might have contributed to their 
varying levels of independence. For example, helitack/rappel crews manage aircraft missions 
that require members to staff various helicopter landing and cargo sites dispersed across the 
geographic area of a fire. Hotshot and Type 2 hand crews each tended to work together as single 
units. Engine crews typically had small modules of three to seven members, and with so few 
people to manage (in comparison to a hotshot or Type 2 hand crew which typically staff 20 
members), the unit might operate with a great deal of autonomy. However, task interdependence 
was a significant predictor of crew prestige (H8) which suggested that, in the wildland fire 
context, it played a strong and pointed role in contributing to crew prestige (above and beyond 
simply being descriptive of the type of coordination required for wildland firefighting tasks).  
 RQ3.  Research question three focused specifically on the interplay among 
communication-based activities and the feel of the crew interaction environment. This research 
question reflected the basic premise found throughout the safety climate literature that climate 
and action are recursively related. Therefore, the feel of the social environment influences 
whether members engage in safety-related action, and safety actions shape the feel of the crew’s 
social climate. The hypotheses pertaining to this research question test which variables have 
more and less influence on each other, and how.  
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Table 6 
Study Two: Research Question 3 Hypotheses and Results
 
 
 To summarize research question three, findings showed that members’ ability to speak 
openly and in-the-moment about safety (safety communication) was a powerful predictor of both 
low social work safety tension (H5) and the crew’s high psychological safety (H7). Exploring the 
conditions that enabled safety communication, H6 found that crew prestige was the strongest 
among several predictors for safety communication, followed by task interdependence and 
independence. This finding revealed the unexpected importance of crew prestige in shaping the 
workgroup’s safety climate and interaction dynamics. Further exploring crew prestige as a 
central predictor for engaging in communication-based learning activities, H8 investigated which 
factors contributed to it. Findings revealed that crew prestige was most closely tied to task 
interdependence and failure learning behaviors. These findings suggested that crew prestige is 
closely associated with a sense of crew collectiveness and an atmosphere that promoted member 
learning through deliberate discussion-based activities, as indicated by the survey items. 
 To synthesize H9a, H9b and H9c, the relationship between crew prestige and social 
work-safety tension was opposite than predicted such that high crew prestige predicted low 
social work safety tension. High independence levels also predicted low social work-safety 
tension while task interdependence had no influence on the dependent variable. This revealed 
that members felt less pressure to engage in unsafe work when they felt free to act independently, 
or if their crew was highly prestigious. Prestige seemed to relate to sense of concern for the 
collective such that prestigious crews were those whose members were aware that there was 
collective concern for acting safely. Independence appeared to relate to an individual’s sense of 
control over avoiding being drawn into group activities he or she felt no control over. 
  14 
 Further, the findings drew a clear distinction between minimal conditions for members to 
act safely, and deliberate activities designed to enhance learning and comfort of the collective 
crew environment.  
 Minimal conditions for safety. Minimal conditions for safe action were indicated in H5, 
which revealed that out of several constructs including safety communication, failure learning, 
psychological safety, and frequency and value of AARs, only safety communication had a 
significant and strong influence on reducing social work-safety tension. It was initially surprising 
that failure learning behaviors and psychological safety did not have significant effects on social 
work safety tension. Examining the items that comprise safety communication, AAR value, 
failure learning, and psychological safety, it appeared that safety communication captured the 
basic and necessary conditions for safety on the crew—specifically, the in-the-moment 
expression of safety concerns. As a result, safety communication partially diffused pressure to 
engage in hazardous activities.  
 Deliberate activities and intentional climate. In addition to basic conditions for safety, 
there also are deliberate actions that contribute to intentionally building a safety climate. 
Psychological safety measured the degree to which the workgroup environment felt safe for 
interpersonal risk-taking. This type of crew environment is likely important in wildland 
firefighting because firefighters face ambiguous fireline circumstances in which it is difficult to 
discern and prioritize hazards. It can be difficult for a firefighter to know if what he or she is 
seeing warrants the concern of others, and members may fear social costs associated with 
bringing up seemingly insignificant concerns. Having strong safety communication and failure 
learning practices in place appeared to facilitate an environment in which there were fewer social 
costs associated with expressing concerns and participating in learning, particularly learning 
from mistakes (H7). In this case, safety communication can be considered a necessary condition 
that enables failure learning activities to occur, meaning that failure learning activities would not 
likely occur without there also being safety communication, but safety communication can be 
present even when failure learning activities are not. 
 Finally, I fit a structural equation (path) model (Kline, 2011) that was a good fit for the 
data χ2(3) = 7.86, p = .05; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .09; SRMR = .03, and all regression paths were 
significant (Figure 2). This model showed several important relationships and how these 
constructs worked together in crew interaction. First, safety communication (β = .61, p < .001) 
was a strong predictor for failure learning behaviors. Previous hypothesis tests suggested that 
safety communication referred to in-the-moment communication behaviors while failure learning 
referred to a more deliberate retrospective learning activity. Second, safety communication (β 
= .44, p < .001) was a stronger predictor for psychological safety than was failure learning (β 
= .34, p < .001), which suggested that the degree to which members feel comfortable for 
interpersonal risk taking on the crew was more strongly influenced by their ability to voice 
concerns in-the-moment (safety communication) than it was by whether their crew deliberately 
engaged in learning activities (failure learning). Third, psychological safety moderately and 
significantly predicted crew prestige (β = .35, p < .001) indicating that highly reputable crews 
were those whose members felt generally comfortable interacting with one another. Finally, crew 
prestige predicted whether the crew engaged in failure learning activities (β = .21, p < .001), as 
well as the degree to which a crew was rated as task interdependent ((β = .39, p < .001). Task 
interdependence acted as a moderator between crew prestige and safety communication such that 
a greater degree of task interdependence predicted higher safety communication (β = .27, p 
< .001). 
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Figure 2. Structural Equation Model depicting relationships among variables measuring the crew interaction 
environment and communication activities. χ2(3) = 7.86, p = .05; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .09; SRMR = .03 
 
 In summary, safety communication appeared to capture the basic and necessary 
conditions for safety on the crew such that safety communication partially diffused pressure to 
engage in hazardous activities. To contrast, failure learning seemed to be a deliberate activity 
rather than a spontaneous one. These findings point to safety communication as being a more 
important predictor for safety climate, in general, because members will feel safer when they are 
able to speak freely about questions and concerns. 
  
V. Integration of Study One and Study Two Findings 
 The primary reason for conducting a mixed methods study using an initiation approach is 
to use insights derived from one research paradigm to inform findings from another while 
maintaining the integrity of both paradigms (Greene, et al., 1989; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009). 
Greene et al., argue that researchers who use this approach often are looking for areas in which 
the findings from one study diverge from the findings from another. These areas of disagreement 
can point to new research questions.  This section integrates findings from Studies One and Two 
to illustrate how one perspective informs the other. Therefore, in the following discussion, I 
apply the central question from the HRO literature to the safety climate literature. The central 
HRO question is: How do patterns of actions and interactions contribute to members’ efforts to 
anticipate, notice, manage and learn about difficult-to-detect hazards? I also apply the central 
question from the safety climate literature to the HRO literature, specifically: What are the social 
pressures that encourage or discourage safe action? I have organized this section around key 
concepts: communication and safety, groupness, task interdependence versus independence, and 
prestige. 
 Communication and safety. Two key concepts around safety emerged from Study One, 
which informed Study Two: safety communication and failure learning. Study One showed that 
Manzanita made safety visible through regular debriefings during which there was ongoing 
interaction between members. In these interactions, members defined the situations and 
discussed which action options were available. Manzanita also regularly conducted retrospective 
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learning-based discussions, which members said were important for creating a comfortable 
communication atmosphere on their crew. In contrast, West Fork’s safety text was around 
voicing their views, acting as individuals and developing discernment that was both tactical and 
social, enabling them to notice problematic situations and to overcome social constraints in order 
to take action.  West Fork did not routinely engage in a retrospective learning-based discussion. 
 Sources for safety-related pressure were different for the two crews: Manzanita members 
engaged in dialogue between mentors and mentees as a way to understand situations and decide 
which actions to take. Thus, there was pressure to engage in learning through communication—
to discuss situations and ask questions before engaging in firefighting action. West Fork 
members described a pressure to act as experts, which was opposite from Manzanita. There was  
pressure to act independently and decisively, and to take on more challenging situations than 
less-experienced crews. However, a large part of West Fork’s expertise was communicatively 
developed (and demonstrated) as they resisted enacting bad decisions that other firefighters—
from their crew or from other crews—recommended. They described their communication-based 
methods for voicing dissent and asserting themselves in order to fulfill their expert role. 
 Study Two indicated that safety communication—in-the-moment communication—was a 
foundational, necessary condition for a safety climate. Safety communication was the strongest 
predictor of low social work-safety tension. Thus, being able to communicate about hazards 
helped people to feel that they had control over how they would handle inherent job risks. This 
hints at the high reliability notion of redundancy, which is the idea that organizational systems 
containing duplication and back-up plans therefore contain more possible ways to successfully 
and safely complete a task (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Redundancy also takes the form 
of skepticism. This means that safety climates in which members feel free to voice concerns in-
the-moment (have high safety communication) will be more redundant, and thus, more highly 
reliable. Manzanita members incorporated safety communication into their dialogue-based 
coorientations with one another while West Fork members engaged in conflict-based 
coorientations in which they asserted a position. Both the conflict- and dialogue-based models 
for redundancy reflect the notion of skepticism. Through dialogue, Manzanita members ask 
questions of each other in order to discover whether they have fully considered the situation and 
action options. Dialogue coorientations place the mentor in the position of explaining and 
justifying their rationale to mentees. The dialogue process might involve mentor and mentee 
confirming the soundness of the safety of a plan, which would be a form of duplication. 
Alternatively, mentees might ask questions about hazards that the mentor overlooked, thus 
introducing a form of skepticism into the interaction that can be further discussed. Similarly, 
West Fork’s conflict-based coorientations introduce skepticism, because they force the 
coorienting parties to justify the safety of their positions. 
 Failure learning routines were a defining element of the Manzanita crew, whose members 
highly valued the AAR learning activity. West Fork members did not talk about regularly 
engaging in such a practice, largely because their dispersed staffing patterns did not enable them 
to easily institute it. However, West Fork did not appear to be hindered by their lack of 
retrospective learning routines, while Manzanita did seem to greatly benefit from them. Study 
Two results indicated that failure-based learning was an equally strong predictor as safety 
communication in contributing to a crew’s psychological safety. This finding indicates that the 
psychological safety of a crew’s interaction environment benefits from open communication, in 
general. However, the deliberate nature of conducting retrospective (e.g., failure-based) learning 
discussions might hint at a particular type of crew environment. For example, in Study One, both 
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Manzanita and West Fork appeared to be able to communicate freely with each other, however 
Manzanita’s deliberate efforts to engage in learning-based discussions reflected a collectively-
held view that the purpose of their crew was to help members learn. In summary, safety 
communication and failure learning were central predictors influencing the psychological safety 
of the workgroup’s climate.   
 Groupness. Study One illustrated that Manzanita’s sense of groupness involved concern 
for the collective of the group while West Fork embraced a broader sense of collective identity as 
experts. Further, the notion of workgroup texts illustrated how notions of groupness informed 
their actions. Manzanita’s concern for collective learning prompted them to engage in activities 
that promoted crew cohesion and conversation. West Fork’s expert identity prompted members 
to take on challenging assignments and act autonomously without supervision.  
 From a safety climate perspective, the groupness texts for both Manzanita and West Fork 
add insights to understanding how social pressures arise from a safety climate. Texts are past 
conversations that have set a precedent for how future interactions should unfold. Therefore, 
Manzanita’s groupness text, based on building cohesion, sets expectations for members to value 
cohesion and do what they can to promote it within the crew. Conversely, members who act in 
ways that divide the crew or who refuse to participate in collective activities will face social 
costs. West Fork’s groupness text, based on being independent experts, set expectations for 
members to be autonomous and resourceful on their own. This expectation might have pressured 
members to feel as though they should avoid asking questions for fear that they would appear to 
be less than an expert, or not worthy for their position on the crew. Therefore, different crew 
texts point to the types of behaviors crews expect of members, and simultaneously, the types of 
behaviors that they marginalize or belittle. Behaviors that are and are not accepted can inform the 
types of social pressures influencing safety-based activities in the workgroup. Thus, safety 
climate literature highlights the importance of supervisors and co-workers in creating 
environments in which members feel comfortable engaging in safety-based activities. 
Considering additional social factors (e.g., identities, expectations) in safety climate literature 
can add breadth to the research. 
 In Study Two the measurements for groupness were grounded in communication 
activities and task interdependence. It makes sense to measure a sense of groupness by focusing 
on activities that bring members together; however, Study One showed that a sense of groupness 
was also rooted in individualism. West Fork exhibited a strong sense of groupness, but it was 
based on their collective identity as independent experts. Further, their sense of collective 
identity was invoked during activities that brought members together, but that they likely took 
for granted, such as joking around or engaging in a sport-based activity. At an organization-wide 
scale, it might be informative to capture the variety of activities that cue groupness for other 
crews like West Fork who assemble around their individualist identity rather than their mutual 
engagement in typical group-based forms of organizing. However, open-ended survey responses, 
observation of crew activities, and additional interviews could be used to gain a wider 
understanding of various forms of groupness. 
 Independence versus task interdependence. In Study One, independence and task 
interdependence emerged as the defining features of the two crews: West Fork was a highly 
independent crew, based largely on their dispersed staffing patterns; Manzanita was a highly task 
interdependent crew, based on their co-located staffing and regular occurrence of learning-based 
communication routines (e.g., AARs, retrospective discussions, proactive planning dialogues).  
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 The intention for testing task interdependence and independence in Study Two was to 
identify crews that were similar to either West Fork or Manzanita. However, crews often scored 
highly on both measures, which pointed to richer conclusions. Thus, instead of using the 
measures to identify which crews were task interdependent versus independent, Study Two 
ultimately explored how independence and task interdependence each influenced safety climate. 
The concepts, task interdependence and independence, appeared to capture different types of 
activities in the wildland firefighting context. 
 On one hand, task interdependence was a significant and strong predictor (along with 
failure learning) of crew prestige. This finding suggested that the degree to which members felt it 
was necessary to work together on tasks might have boosted the feelings that their collaborations 
were necessary to produce high-quality work. A strong sense of task interdependence might cue 
an awareness of the collective crew, which could cause firefighters to consider more 
conservative actions regarding hazards. 
 On the other hand, task interdependency appeared to assess basic and ongoing aspects of 
firefighting, as the work tends to be large-scale, and it typically requires coordination among 
numerous resources. Thus, task interdependence may simply cue members to think about the 
nature of the work rather than distinctive aspects of how their crews operated (which was the 
intended measure). In contrast, firefighters did notably vary in their opportunities to work 
independently. Independent crews were found to be more resistant to pressures to take risks than 
were less independent crews. Thus opportunities to exercise independent action enable members 
to feel more control over their circumstances, and as a result, less pressure to go along with 
hazardous decisions made by groups.  
 Prestige. Study One indicated that West Fork members thought highly of their crew and 
strived to uphold its highly professional reputation within the firefighting community. Thus, 
West Fork was a prestigious crew. Manzanita members did not talk directly about their crew 
being prestigious, but that did not mean that they lacked prestige. Rather, for them, they took 
pride in playing a pivotal role in facilitating less-experienced firefighters’ efforts to gain 
experience. While highly valued, they did not talk about their prestige in terms of upholding a 
particular “reputation” (as West Fork members did). In Study One, West Fork members, whose 
interviews invoked the concept of crew prestige directly, informed which indicators I chose to 
explore in Study Two. West Fork members talked about how their crew had a good reputation, 
and that working there “looked good” on their firefighting resume, etc. In conducting Study Two, 
I anticipated that the notion of crew prestige would be linked to upholding a capable reputation 
and therefore, pressures to perform when safety was not fully implemented--a feeling that some 
West Fork members said they experienced. 
 However, Study Two revealed very different results than expected. First, results showed 
that crew prestige was a significant predictor of psychological safety when combined with failure 
learning and safety communication. The higher the collective esteem about the crew, the more 
members valued their contributions and wanted to share them, thus the higher their psychological 
safety. In contrast to Study One, this finding linked crew prestige with a desire to contribute to 
the collective group, rather than linking prestige to independent actions.  
 Second, I hypothesized that high crew prestige would predict high pressure from crew 
members to engage hazards (social work-safety tension). This hypothesis was significant, but in 
the opposite direction than expected. High crew prestige, in fact, predicted lower levels of social 
work-safety tension (β = -.28, p < .01; see Table 6). If prestige indicates that certain actions were 
rewarded with a good reputation, then this finding indicates that fire crews value conservative 
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actions toward engaging hazards, rather than taking bold risks. This is a substantial finding 
because it illustrates a broadly-reaching value among wildland firefighters for conservative 
actions. 
 In a third hypothesized relationship (H6, Table 6), crew prestige was found to be the 
strongest predictor of safety communication (along with task interdependence and independence). 
Items in crew prestige measured the degree to which a crew was highly regarded both by 
members and within the firefighting community. This finding could be interpreted to mean that 
freedom to voice safety concerns upwardly and in general (i.e., safety communication) among 
the crew was a highly regarded activity in wildland firefighting. Further, for members to consider 
their group to be prestigious, they must think highly of the collective, including the ways the 
crew accomplished work, the degree to which it upheld high standards, and the belief that 
membership on the crew was sought-after within firefighting. 
 Therefore, Study Two diverged from Study One findings on the notion of prestige. In 
Study One, prestige was linked to West Fork’s autonomy, high expertise and pressure to take on 
hazards that other crews were not experienced enough to handle. In contrast, Study Two revealed 
that prestige, within the broader wildland firefighting profession, was linked to safety 
communication behaviors, a lack of pressure to engage hazards, and the psychological safety of 
the crew’s interaction environment. This diversion in results might indicate that West Fork’s 
emphasis of living up to a certain reputation did not, in fact, reflect the notion of prestige as it is 
conceptualized within the broader firefighting community. Perhaps West Fork’s emphasis on 
their good reputation was a way to justify how their particular style of crew organizing was 
valuable, and set them apart from other crews (rather than defining a widely accepted notion of 
prestige among wildland firefighting crews). 
 
VI. Relationship to Related Work 
 
 For wildland firefighting, theory and practice are closely intertwined. The wildland 
firefighting agencies look to the scientific literature to develop safety programs that protect 
firefighters’ lives. The dissertation project summarized in this report connects with the increasing 
body of social science research situated in the wildland firefighting context, particularly in 
organizational communication and organizational behavior. This engaged scholarship has 
resulted in fruitful collaborations between scholars and the wildland firefighting community 
(Simpson & Seibold, 2008). Studies examine identification and organizational control (Bullis & 
Tompkins, 1989), organizational discourses in wildland firefighting (Thackaberry, 2004; Zeigler, 
2007), member error detection (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009), firefighter voice (Lewis, 2007), and 
childhood socialization that prepares “country boys” for wildland firefighting work (Desmond, 
2006, 2007, 2010).  Both studies in this dissertation demonstrated the utility of using a 
communication-based approach to understand safety. Theoretical contributions of this work can 
be applied to high reliability organizations and safety climate in order to better understand how 
safety is grounded in action, is a product of preoccupation with failure and redundancy. This 
dissertation also demonstrates the importance of examining phenomena at the interaction- and 
workgroup-levels of analysis. This section describes theoretical implications followed by 
recommendations for managers. 
 Grounded in action. A CCO approach to high reliability is grounded in action, assuming 
that action is social and practical. Therefore, a communicative perspective asks in what ways do 
members enact appropriate actions? Here, appropriate action is not purely based on what is 
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going on in the environment, but strongly subject to the social pressures at the workgroup level 
that shape what is accepted as normative and appropriate action. Study One described the notion 
of crew text as a record of past conversations in which members had instantiated the organization, 
and which had set a precedent for current and future actions (Taylor & Van Every, 2000). When 
applied to safety climate literature, the notion of crew texts could help elucidate the types of 
behavior expectations that emerge in workgroups and why. For example, Manzanita’s safety text 
involved engaging in communication activities that built trust and cohesion among members. 
Members expected themselves and others to participate communicatively. The resulting safety 
climate was comfortable and conducive for dialogue.   
 Wildland firefighting workgroups were a fruitful context for qualitative, CCO-based 
research due to the prevalence and importance of the organization’s safety rules in members’ 
ongoing interactions. It is theoretically and practically interesting that the interviewees 
interpreted the safety rules so differently, especially since the participants indicated that the 
organization largely considers the safety rules (the Ten Standard Firefighting Orders) to be self-
evident and easy to apply to fire situations. It is further notable that the two workgroups’ uses of 
routines shaped members’ interpretations of how to implement tasks and safety. Routines 
functioned as the translation of the safety rules into physical action; the types of routines that 
emerged reflected the workgroup’s texts (Taylor & Van Every, 2000). Thus, wildland 
firefighting was a rich environment for studying CCO because firefighting efforts on large fires 
often function in a dispersed and emergent way. Emergent contexts require members to enact the 
organization by drawing from their previous instantiations of it, in addition to drawing from 
various organizational elements. These emergent processes were common among the wildland 
firefighting interactions (co-orientations) examined in Study One. 
 Preoccupation with failure. Communicative interactions and safety climate deepen our 
understanding of high reliability organizing as an emergent process that occurs at the workgroup 
level of analysis. Specifically, scholars consider that one defining element of HROs is that they 
are “preoccupied with failure,” meaning that accidents provide crucial opportunities to unearth 
previously unseen hazards. Findings from accident investigations are considered to be forms of 
“organizational knowledge.” For wildland firefighters and other HROs, organizational 
knowledge is then dispersed to members via new rules or safety policies (Zeigler, 2007). 
However, the effectiveness of rules and policies to protect worker safety—and to truly function 
as useable knowledge—depends on how rules and policies are translated into action. Study One 
showed that this translation is an emergent, interactive process at the workgroup level. Therefore, 
researchers could extend HRO literature by researching how workgroups are “preoccupied with 
failure” through various interactions. Study One examined critical incident narratives; 
researchers could extend the work by examining everyday communication episodes. Research 
questions to consider include: How do workgroups incorporate the findings from large-scale 
accident investigations into their daily talk, and into their ongoing safety and task-based 
activities? How do workgroups incorporate their daily small-scale mistakes into routine safety-
based conversations? Also, what workgroup-level social factors influence whether members 
value and participate in communicative learning-based routines? What specific workgroup-level 
values predict whether a workgroup maintains and perceives benefit from failure-based learning 
routines? 
 Redundancy. One mechanism for reliability in the HRO literature is the notion of 
redundancy. Redundancy refers to duplication and backups, but also skepticism—the ability for 
members to question one another (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). In Study One, both 
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Manzanita and West Fork had redundancy built into their coorientation interactions. For 
Manzanita, redundancy was built into the mentorship dialogue that encouraged inexperienced 
members to ask question, often ones that supervisors did not expect. As a Manzanita supervisor 
noted, “We get great questions from the newer [less experienced] folks—about things I take for 
granted, things I don’t even think about anymore, but they bring it up.” Manzanita’s model for 
redundancy is duplication as members evaluate a situation, talk about what they are seeing, and 
decide how to take action. West Fork follows a skepticism model for redundancy in which 
members gain experience asserting themselves, using the organization’s rules as a trump card to 
push a plan or voice dissent. The above two models for redundancy point to a potential area for 
theoretical expansion. The present models—duplication and skepticism—were rooted in the 
coorientation interactions of members. However, the ways members interacted (e.g., dialogue or 
conflict) extended from the characteristic interaction patterns of Manzanita and West Fork. 
Across the organization as a whole, there are likely numerous types of interaction patterns that 
inform how workgroup members act. Thus, there might be numerous ways that members create 
redundancy as they negotiate their activities through communicative interaction. 
 Member learning. Study One also showed that the two crews had different learning 
models that served different purposes. In contrast to Manzanita’s dialogue-based model, West 
Fork members used a conflict-based learning model. These models functioned in alignment with 
each crew’s text such that Manzanita members’ dialogue-based learning model functioned to 
foster trust and cohesion among members, while West Fork’s conflict model helped members to 
think independently. Study Two partially corroborated these findings revealing that high levels 
of safety communication and failure learning significantly and moderately predicted higher 
levels of psychological safety. In this case, psychological safety acts as a rough equivalent for 
trust and cohesion as it measures the degree to which a crew is safe for interpersonal risk taking. 
Also, higher degrees of independence were related to lower levels of social work-safety tension. 
Thus, thinking for one’s self may help a firefighter to develop discernment in evaluating hazards 
and, importantly, to trust that he or she will not get swept up into hazardous dysfunctional 
momentum of the workgroup.  
 In HROs, high performance is emphasized. The two studies showed distinct 
communication-based models for member learning. Manzanita’s mentorship dialogue model was 
easy to identify. However, while less immediately apparent, West Fork’s conflict-based 
interactions also comprised a learning model. These conflict interactions that members described 
were formative experiences helping them to develop communication strategies that resulted in 
action (e.g., dissenting effectively, asserting a plan, etc.). These findings illustrated that HROs 
should prioritize and encourage member learning in its numerous forms, because different 
models for learning are interactive. Therefore, practice engaging in different kinds of 
communicative interactions builds members’ communication repertoires. A deep repertoire 
equips members to apply different communication strategies to a variety of circumstances, and 
with various effects.  
 The danger of ideal types. Safety climate research and HRO studies tend to implicitly 
assume that more communication, and a greater sense of group cohesiveness are “preferred” 
ways of organizing safely. Indeed, both Studies One and Two revealed that these ways of 
organizing promoted a sense of togetherness, enhancing overall psychological safety and helping 
members feel comfortable voicing concerns and insights. Manzanita offered what could be 
considered an ideal type of crew that was highly effective at building members’ experiences and 
engaging them in planning routines. Their highly communicative interactions illustrate the 
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classic model for collective sensemaking in high reliability organizing (Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2005). However, there is a danger to exalt Manzanita as the single ideal model for 
workgroup organizing based solely on the crew’s highly communicative, cohesion-building 
activities because these activities do not represent the range of social situations one might 
encounter in an HRO. Manzanita might not offer a challenging enough social environment for 
members seeking to build a repertoire of communication skills helpful to them in higher levels of 
the wildland fire command authority.  
 In HROs, time pressure requires that members must act decisively. In doing so, their 
communicative interactions need to produce action (Taylor & Van Every, 2000). Turning 
communication into action requires that members generate authority. Study One illustrated the 
importance of crews like West Fork, in which expectations to act autonomously provided 
members with opportunities to practice assuming authority, asserting plans and voicing dissent. 
While these accounts of West Fork interactions were characterized by conflict, it was the very 
engagement in conflict-based interactions that enabled members to practice advocating for 
themselves. In doing so, they were able to see how their actions generated results, oftentimes 
interrupting a potentially problematic trajectory of action (see also Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). 
Because HROs require tight coordination under time pressure and intense circumstances, 
conditions do not always foster dialogue-based interactions. Members need to know how to 
engage other firefighters in ways that result in immediate effect. Thus, exercising authority 
through communication depended on members effectively drawing the organization’s rules into 
the conversation. Invoking the organizations rules enabled their communication to do something 
(Cooren & Taylor, 1997), such as refusing or asserting a plan. 
 In summary so far, neither Manzanita nor West Fork exemplified the ideal model for 
workgroup organizing. Instead, each crew provided a valuable environment for members at 
different stages of experience to hone skills related to communicative interaction, evaluating 
circumstances and devising plans. In HROs, different ways of communicating contribute to 
different kinds of results. Mentorship requires one kind of communicative interaction, while 
exercising authority requires another. However both interactions are necessary for safety. Both 
studies show that the mix of expertise on the crew matters because it influences the interaction 
patterns by which expertise is gained. For example, inexperienced firefighters should not work 
on crews like West Fork in which the majority of members are highly expert because the 
interaction patterns are not in place to facilitate learning for an inexperienced firefighter. Instead, 
crews like Manzanita, with a mix of roughly half experienced and half inexperienced members, 
are more likely to have routines in place to facilitate learning. Further, expert crews like West 
Fork offer invaluable opportunities for firefighters who already have a solid foundation of 
knowledge and on-the-ground experience. Being pushed to work autonomously, assume 
authority and take responsibility for managing extremely complex circumstances prepares these 
individuals and crews to take the lead in safely dealing with the increasingly large-scale 
complexity of wildfire disasters. Understanding crew interaction patterns and safety routines can 
inform deliberate efforts to ensure that firefighters are placed on the types of crews that will 
enable learning while providing for their safety. 
 
VII. Management Implications: Recommendations for Crew Leaders 
 
 Findings from both studies summarized in this report affirmed the importance of crew 
level activities for implementing safety and developing firefighter experience. Study One showed 
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that Manzanita and West Fork each maintained different communication and learning models 
that involved fostering mentorship and gaining practice with asserting authority, respectively. 
These learning models each contributed to the distinctive feel of the crew environments, and 
served the crews in different ways. Related to the feel of the crew environments, Study Two 
findings showed that open communicative exchange on crews contributed to members feeling 
comfortable voicing their concerns, and avoiding pressure to engage situations when safety was 
not in place. From these findings, I next describe how organizational leaders and crew leaders 
can foster consistent communicative routines, and learning from in-the-moment action. 
 Consistent communicative routines. The two studies in this project illustrated the 
importance of consistent communication routines in contributing to a comfortable and safety-
conscious crew environment. A communicative crew environment is particularly important for 
crews that have high turnover, and for crews which have inexperienced members. When 
communicative routines (such as AARs or informal debriefings) are conducted on a regular basis 
within the crew, members who are unfamiliar with each other (e.g., due to high turnover) can 
become more comfortable voicing concerns as they get to know their crew members. Also, when 
inexperienced members are encouraged to talk about their fire experiences and questions, they 
become accustomed to voicing their questions and concerns. Consistent communication routines 
help to create a communication environment that facilitates safety. 
 How leaders can facilitate the crew’s communication environment. A communication 
forum plays an important role in helping members deepen their experience through sensemaking 
processes. The after action review (AAR) is one example of a possible communication forum 
that crews can draw upon. My findings show several recommendations for managers that would 
enhance the efficacy of this type of routine.  
 First, members must share and accept the value of the routine. Crew leaders can facilitate 
their members' acceptance of the routine by demonstrating their own value of it. If managers take 
the routine seriously, then they will set the example for how other members interpret the 
routine's value.  
 Second, managers should foster a comfortable communication environment so that 
members feel welcome to contribute openly to the discussion. Crew leaders can accomplish this 
by encouraging (but not forcing) members to participate. For example, crew leaders can 
positively reinforce member participation by thanking members for sharing, by asking follow-up 
questions that encourage more discussion with the participating member, and by sharing their 
own questions and insights in ways that demonstrate the spirit of what the routine aims to 
accomplish (e.g., communicative openness on the crew). It is important that the crew 
environment be free of judgment so that members feel they can talk about anything, including 
their mistakes, which is crucial for HROs that are "preoccupied with failure."  
 Third, findings from Study One showed the importance of having the communicative 
routine be a consistent aspect of crew life. Manzanita members expected to debrief after every 
work shift, regardless of what occurred that day. For this reason, members said they actively 
thought about questions and topics to discuss as they engaged in their work. Therefore, by 
making sure that the routine is conducted on a consistent basis, crew leaders demonstrate the 
importance of the routine. Members know they will be expected to participate to the routine, and 
as a result, will hold themselves accountable to finding topics to discuss. 
 Learning from in-the-moment action. Findings from Study One showed the importance 
of in-the-moment-action in generating experience for West Fork members. West Fork members 
were highly experienced and were challenged to take on independent assignments and high 
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levels of responsibility. Many of the members had moved beyond a mentorship model of 
communication and learning and were focused on honing their skills at thinking independently 
like experts. Thus, helping members to develop skills with their in-the-moment action was a 
crucial step toward deepening expertise. Crews with highly experienced members, and crews 
whose members have high collective tenure, can benefit from providing members with 
opportunities to manage in-the-moment action. 
 How crew leaders can facilitate learning from in-the-moment action. First, members 
should be allowed opportunities for tactical experimentation. This means that they should be 
given assignments challenging them to step out of their "comfort zone." Crew leaders can 
provide members with chances to be autonomous in deciding which tactics to implement. 
Opportunities for autonomy cultivate independent thinking because members carry the weight of 
their responsibility and decisions. Crew leaders can facilitate autonomous action on these types 
of crews by also leveling the hierarchy of the crew such that all members are given decision-
making latitude and are granted authority and flexibility to act autonomously on a regular basis 
on the crew. 
 Second, tactical experimentation provides members with the chance to see firsthand which 
actions work and which do not. Having opportunities to make mistakes is important here because 
the firsthand observation helps members to embody the knowledge. For example, West Fork 
members talked about experiences in which they had to change the ways they implemented 
escape routes and safety zones in spatial terrain due to having to narrowly escape flames. These 
experiences could be considered "mistakes," even though the tactics made sense in the moment. 
Thus, through autonomous action and tactical experimentation, members discovered new 
insights about which characteristics to prioritize when designating a safety zone. Crew leaders 
can foster tactical experimentation on crews by first knowing members' skills and experience 
levels, and then by assigning fire assignments to members that will push them slightly beyond 
their skill levels. However, it is important to note that crew leaders must have thorough 
knowledge of their crew members' experience levels because pushing them too far beyond their 
capabilities could place members in situations that they are not equipped to handle. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
 The two studies described in this summary document have illustrated that communication 
processes critically shape how safety is accomplished in wildland firefighting workgroups. Both 
studies demonstrated that wildland firefighting is not an individual activity, but a group one. 
Therefore, safety is a collective accomplishment that is socially defined through the workgroup’s 
appropriate and normative safety actions. Study One showed the importance of communication 
in shaping everyday enactments of tasks and safety; findings illustrated how members’ patterns 
of interactions set a precedent for appropriate behavior. These expectations influence how 
members enact tasks. Study Two illustrated that communication-based activities helped members 
to feel less pressure to take risks and enhanced their perception that the workgroup was a safe 
interpersonal environment. 
                                                
i I did not directly sample within federal agencies whose wildland firefighting resources are relatively limited, 
primarily temporary/seasonal, or embedded in localities that lacked a central contact representative. These agencies 
include the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Sampling from the BIA might 
have somewhat increased representation by Native American firefighters. 
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IX. Deliverables Crosswalk Table 
 
Deliverables Promised 
Proposed Delivered Status 
Conference 
presentation(s) 
Preliminary results presented at 3 total conference meetings for 
wildland firefighting and communication 
Completed PowerPoint 
presentations available on 
Firescience.gov 
Workshop(s)/ 
presentation(s) 
Present findings and communication tools to firefighters at 
preseason training. 
Completed March 2012; 
available on firescience.gov 
Doctoral 
Dissertation 
The Communicative Construction of Safety in Wildland 
Firefighting. (Former working title: Unpacking the risk 
assessment processes in firefighting crews) 
Completed June 2012; 
available on firescience.gov 
 
Peer reviewed 
publication 
Submission of manuscript for peer review in communication 
journal  
In progress; expected 
submission August 2012 
Final report Present results of the project to JFSP governing board. Final report completed; 
available on firescience.gov 
 
Extra Items Delivered 
Conference proceedings Completed Conference proceeding papers (cited below) available on Firescience.gov 
   
 
Conference Presentations and Proceedings 
Jahn, J. L. S. (April 2012). Communication and High Reliability: How the Crew Environment Facilitates 
or Inhibits Wildland Firefighter Learning. Paper presented to the International Association of 
Wildland Fire, Seattle, WA. 
Jahn, J. L. S. (April 2011). Learning by Doing: Wildland Firefighters’ Stories about their Pivotal Fireline 
Learning Experiences. Paper presented to the International Association of Wildland Fire, 
Missoula, MT. 
Jahn, J. L. S. (November 2010). Social Bodies: Bringing Materiality into Theorizing about High 
Reliability Organizations. Paper presented to the Organizational Communication Division of the 
National Communication Association, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Wildland Firefighter Workshop 
Jahn, J. L. S. (March 2012). Interviewing Techniques that Capture Crew Culture and Sensemaking. 
Facilitated Learning Analysis Workshop. National Advanced Fire and Resource Institute, Tucson, 
AZ. March 7, 2012. 
 
Doctoral Dissertation 
Jahn, J. L. S. (2012). The Communicative Construction of Safety in Wildland Firefighting. (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
 
Final Report 
Jahn, J. L. S., Putnam, L. L., & Black, A. E. (2012). The Communicative Construction of Safety in 
Wildland Firefighting. Final Project Report (JFSP Project Number: 10-3-01-4). July 10, 2012. 
Santa Barbara, CA.  
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